This blog is not intended to create any attorney client relationship between the author and anyone reading this blog. The blog is solely the opinion of the author and carries no legal weight and should not be relied upon by any reader. If the issue raised in this blog is of interest to the reader, she or he should contact an attorney of choice to discuss the issue.
There is no bright line that leads to an answer to questions raised in this blog. The blog is meant to give some light on a subject that happens but for which a remedy is seldom or ever pursued. It is the issue of the angry judge.
There is no bright line that leads to an answer to questions raised in this blog. The blog is meant to give some light on a subject that happens but for which a remedy is seldom or ever pursued. It is the issue of the angry judge.
All
most people hope for when they appear before the court is a fair
hearing on their case, i.e. due process. Civil due process was
described by Justice Brennan in Goldberg
v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) @ 267.
Goldberg
involved an action brought in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York by residents of New York City who were receiving
financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home
Relief program. Their complaint was that New York State and New York
City officials administering these programs terminated such aid
without prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of
law.
The
court wrote that “The fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard.' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914). The hearing must be 'at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).” 267
“(a)nd, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.” In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955); Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.E. 33, 45-46, 70 S.Ct. 445, 451, 452, 94
L.Ed 616 (1950) “
In
a social security hearing the ALJ is to be the inquisitor, and the
impartial finder of fact. Can a judge who becomes angery toward the
claimant, have that anger deny the claimant due process?
Suppose
the claimant in a social security disability case is a person with
some mental impairment, who is angry and has a history of having
trouble controlling his emotions. At the hearing under questioning by
the ALJ, the claimant becomes more and more up-set over the on-going
questioning by the judge. He melts down and forcefully questions the
Judge on why the judge continues to ask him the same questions. He is
so upset that he has to leave the room and calm down. On return, the
judge again starts questioning claimant. The claimant again becomes
angry. Unfortunately, this time the judge is clearly angry and the
two start yelling at each other, until the claimant leave the hearing
room ignoring demands from the judge to return to his seat.
Because
of the out-burst a second hearing was scheduled giving time for
mental examination of the claimant. The same judge presided over the
second hearing.
The
decision is a denial of benefits. In the decision, there is a
statement by the judge emphasizing the confrontation, and finding it
showed a lack of credibility as it was not inspired by his mental
condition, but merely a desire for gain, i.e. benefits.
Did
the judge’s conduct deny the claimant due process and a fair
hearing? Stated differently, can an angry judge be fair and
impartial?
The
first impulse is to look at who instigated the confrontation. It is
easy to dismiss a challenge to the fairness of a decision when it was
the party against who the decision ran being the person who
instigated the confrontation, but is that fair?
Subtracting
from the formulation, those incidents in which the party causes an
angry confrontation with the judge for the sole purpose of raising
the issue of due process or to delay the case or to get a different
judge, we deal with claimant’s who did not plan to have such a
confrontation, but because of impairment, serious or not, cannot keep
emotion in check. We also deal with a judge, who is losing control
over the courtroom and believes he/she has a right to angrily demand
that the claimant conform his/her conduct. We have a claimant who
may or may not be able to conform his conduct to the judge’s
standard.
The
result is a loud, angry, significant confrontation between a judge
demanding the claimant return to his seat and conform his/her conduct
and a claimant who believes s/he is being wrongfully attacked by the
judge’s questions.
When
the judge has become so angry that the judge loses all composure, it
is hard to believe, no matter who initiated the confrontation that,
given human nature, the claimant can receive unbiased treatment by
that judge.
In
support of that proposition, consider what the U.S. Supreme Court
discussed in Ungar
v. Saratire,
376 US 575 (1964). Ungar
involved a contempt of court action against a party for actions
performed before the Judge who ultimately held him in contempt of
court. Although a different action than involved herein, it does have
the component of a sole inquisitor, a judge, previously embroiled
with the party being the same judge to adjudicate the contempt of
court.
“The bias here is not
financial but emotional. In re Murchison, supra, involved a closely
related question arising in a state case. There the judge who served
as the 'one-man grand jury' also had doubts about the way in which a
witness testified before him. He charged him with contempt for
refusing to answer. We reversed the conviction, saying, 'It would be
very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to act as a grand
jury and then try the (Page 601)very persons accused as a result of
his investigations... A single 'judge-grand jury' is even more a part
of the accusatory process than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having
been a part of that process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of
things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those
accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor,
it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal.
Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let
prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.' 349
U.S., at 137, 75 S.Ct., at 625, 99 L.Ed. 942.
Judges are human; and judges
caught up in an altercation with a witness do not have the
objectivity to give that person a fair trial.
Criminal case or civil case,
the premise remains the same. Altercations between the judge and the
claimant should immediately raise a red flag. A claimant in many
cases has his life, property, and happiness dependent upon a
favorable ruling. An unfavorable finding may mean the person remains
on the street, remains dependent upon family, and loss of whatever
property that was owned.
With due regard to any
argument social security may raise, first as noted in U.S.
v Gantley 172
F. 3d 422 (6th
Cir. 1999) @431, “a defendant's 'right to have his case resolved by
a particular tribunal will be subordinate to the larger interest of
the public in 'fair trials designed to end in just judgment”.
Complaints
concerning crowded calendars, delays in the process, inefficiency
should all fall to the wayside, assigning a new judge to complete the
hearing is needed to protect the sanctity of the proceedings.
Secondly, arguments that judges are used to this type of conduct.
They are trained to handle such out bursts and basely arguments. The
bottom line is as noted by Justice Douglas in Unger:
“Judges are human; and judges caught up in an altercation with a
witness do not have the objectivity to give that person a fair
trial.”
This situation does not
occur that often, but when it does, in
my opinion,
fairness requires that the judge hearing the case, recluse
himself/herself, and has a new finder of fact, conclude the case and
make the disability decision.